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Essay

The Chevronization of Auer
Kristin E. Hickman† & Mark R. Thomson††
Kisor v. Wilkie is pending before the Supreme Court as part
of OT 2018.1 The sole question in Kisor is whether the Court
should jettison the deferential standard of judicial review known
as Auer deference, which directs courts to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation unless the interpretation is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.2 The
Court’s decision to hear argument in Kisor makes this an opportune time to reassess Auer’s rationales.
When it first announced the Auer standard—in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.—the Supreme Court did not provide
much explanation or justification for it.3 Auer’s supporters subsequently identified several. Broadly speaking, the rationales for
Auer can be grouped into two categories: doctrinal and practical.
The overwhelming majority of scholarship and opinion regarding Auer deference focuses on its doctrinal underpinnings—
i.e., whether Auer is sound as a matter of legal theory.4 It is emphatically not this essay’s purpose to join that debate. Instead,
† Distinguished McKnight University Professor & Harlan Albert Rogers
Professor in Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Copyright © 2019 by
Kristin E. Hickman.
†† Associate Attorney, Crowell & Moring LLP. The authors thank Nick
Bednar and Aaron Nielson for helpful comments. Copyright © 2019 by Mark R.
Thomson.
1. Order Granting Certiorari, Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15, 139 S. Ct. 657,
2018 WL 6439837 (Dec. 10, 2018) (Mem.).
2. See id.; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
3. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (granting deference based on “our jurisprudence,” but without explaining the reasons underlying that jurisprudence);
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (declaring, without explanation or citation, that “the ultimate criterion [in construing an ambiguous regulation] is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”).
4. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vemeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (2017); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri
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this essay focuses on the practical rationales for Auer, which
have received much less scholarly attention.
What are those practical rationales? Although he ultimately
called for the Court to repudiate the Auer standard,5 Justice Antonin Scalia neatly summarized them:
[Auer deference] makes the job of a reviewing court much easier, and
since it usually produces affirmance of the agency’s view without conflict in the Circuits, it imparts (once the agency has spoken to clarify
the regulation) certainty and predictability to the administrative process.6

Auer’s defenders often echo those points, contending that
Auer (1) simplifies the judicial task,7 (2) ensures that courts
across the country give the same meaning to ambiguous regulations,8 and (3) allows regulated parties to more accurately forecast how courts will construe ambiguous regulations.9
These practical rationales have some outward appeal. Pinning down the precise meaning of a particular word or phrase
can be tedious and difficult, for instance when the word or phrase
is highly technical in scope or depends for its meaning on other
parts of a convoluted regulatory scheme. When multiple courts
undertake to interpret the same ambiguous regulatory language, the result is often multiple interpretations of that language, so that the regulation ends up meaning different things
in different jurisdictions. Uncertainty about how a particular
regulation applies can, in turn, make it difficult for regulated
parties to conform their actions to the law. Auer promises to
solve those problems with a simple and straightforward command: when the answer isn’t obvious, the agency’s interpretation controls.

Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449 (2011); John
F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996).
5. Decker v. Northwest Envt’l Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–21 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
7. See, e.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 298.
8. See, e.g., Matthew Mezger, Using Interpretive Methodology to Get Out
From Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1335, 1358–59
(2016); Ben Snowden, Has Auer’s Hour Arrived?, 28 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T
31, 34 (2014).
9. See, e.g., Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 813, 816–17 (2015).
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The practical argument for Auer deference only holds up,
however, to the extent Auer actually is simple and straightforward to apply. As the Auer standard becomes more difficult to
apply, the practical rationales that support it become less compelling.
This problem is not merely theoretical. For several years,
courts have been carving qualifications and exceptions into Auer
that have transformed a seemingly simple legal standard into a
doctrine of uncertain scope and application. A list of those exceptions, and questions they raise, might include the following:

Auer deference does not apply where a regulation is clear.10
But what qualifies a regulation as unclear? And what interpretive tools should courts apply before concluding that a
regulation is unclear?

Auer deference is unwarranted when an agency’s interpretation “does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question,” as when the interpretation conflicts with a prior one, or when it appears to be
nothing more than a “convenient litigating position,” or a
“post hoc rationalization advanced by an agency seeking to
defend past agency action against attack.”11 Courts have
disagreed about how to apply each of those exceptions.12

Some courts have held that some types of nonbinding
agency pronouncements are not due Auer deference, notwithstanding that those same courts routinely defer to
other nonbinding agency pronouncements.13 The basis for
this disparate treatment is murky at best.
10. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
11. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012).
12. See, e.g., Ohio Dept’ of Medicaid v. Price, 864 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2017)
(Clay, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for deferring to an interpretation that
was “nothing more than a convenient litigating position”) (quotation marks
omitted); Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, 799 F.3d 633, 674 (7th Cir. 2015)
(Manion, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing majority for deferring to an interpretation that was “entirely new and inconsistent with [the agency’s] prior interpretations”); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, More or Less in
Penn Twp., 768 F.3d 300, 316–17 (3d Cir. 2014) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for deferring to agency’s newly-announced interpretation that
was adopted “in reaction to the District Court’s decision in this case”).
13. See, e.g., Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (en banc) (declining to give Auer deference to an interpretation by the
Patent and Trademark Office because the interpretation was announced in an
“interpretive nonbinding discussion” that was later re-designated as a “representative non-binding discussion”); Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 532
(9th Cir. 2011) (declining to defer to an interpretation announced in a singlemember, nonprecedential decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals).
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Auer deference does not apply to interpretations of regulations that give rise to penalties.14 The origin of this exception lies in due process and the notion that a party should
have adequate notice that its actions violate agency regulations before being subject to civil penalties.15 The distinction
between penalties and mere adverse results is not always
clear.16
Relatedly, an interpretation is not due Auer deference if it
would result in “unfair surprise” to regulated parties.17
What constitutes a surprise, and what differentiates a fair
surprise from an unfair one, is anyone’s guess.
Auer deference does not apply to interpretations of regulations that merely paraphrase or “parrot” statutory language.18 How much daylight must there be between a regulation and the statute for deference to apply?
In at least some instances, when Auer does not apply, the
multi-factor Skidmore standard replaces it.19 But when
must a court move on to analyze an agency’s interpretation
of a regulation using Skidmore, as opposed to merely invalidating the interpretation de novo, for example as contrary
to the regulation?

14. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 154; see also KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD
J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.8.2 (6th ed. 2018) (observing
that courts have been less inclined to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations when doing so would subject parties to civil penalties without
prior notice that their conduct was unlawful).
15. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 14, at § 3.8.2 (recognizing this line of
cases).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(analogizing a product recall order to the imposition of penalties for this purpose); Upton v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 75 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1996)
(declining to defer in license suspension case); see also HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 14, at § 3.8.2 (“[C]ourts in some cases have applied this approach even
when the ‘penalty’ takes the form of particularly onerous consequences, rather
than a fine or more traditional form of punishment.”).
17. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 154.
18. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006); Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 290 (2011) (evaluating this Auer exception).
19. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (calling upon
courts to give “weight” to an agency’s interpretation of a statute “depend[ing]
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”); Christopher, 567
U.S. at 159 (applying Skidmore in a case involving unfair surprise); Gonzales,
546 U.S. at 268–69 (applying Skidmore to an interpretation of a parroting regulation).
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This list of Auer exceptions and issues is non-exhaustive, and it
seems likely that courts will identify new exceptions to Auer going forward. A multi-step Auer doctrine is emerging,20 one that
mirrors the several steps and complexity of Auer deference’s
close cousin, Chevron deference.21 Indeed, using phraseology eerily reminiscent of Chevron’s two steps, the Solicitor General’s
brief in the Kisor case suggests that “[c]ourts should apply [Auer]
deference only after exhausting all the traditional tools of interpretation and determining that the agency has reasonably interpreted any genuine ambiguity,” and even then “only if the
agency’s interpretation represents its fair, considered, and consistent judgment.”22 With each new exception or qualification,
the Auer standard becomes harder to apply and less certain in
its application—two criticisms long leveled at Chevron deference.
Like Auer, Chevron started simply: Courts should defer to
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguities in the statutes those agencies are tasked with administering.23 For decades, however, courts have been piling caveats and qualifications atop Chevron’s basic premise. Courts and commentators
have argued extensively over exactly how ambiguous a statute
needs to be before deference becomes appropriate,24 and which
20. See, e.g., Marsh v. J. Alexander’s LLC, 905 F.3d 610, 624 n.12 (9th Cir.
2018) (en banc) (describing “Auer’s two-step analysis”); see also HICKMAN &
PIERCE, supra note 14, at § 3.8.3 (describing how Auer “may be developing its
own Step Zero, Step One, and Step Two to resemble the steps of Mead and Chevron”).
21. The Chevron doctrine derives from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which instructed reviewing
courts evaluating agency interpretations of statutes to consider first whether
the meaning of the relevant statute is clear, and if it’s not, then whether the
agency’s resolution of the statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Id. at 842–43. For
just one of many, many scholarly discussions of Chevron’s complexity, see Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1392, 1418–41 (2017) (surveying Chevron’s many questions and resulting variations).
22. See Brief for Respondent at 28, 30, Kisor v. Wilkie, —- S. Ct. —- (No.
18-15), 2019 WL 929000, at *28, *30 (Feb. 25, 2019).
23. See Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Chevron purported to establish a simple and predictable method . . . .”).
24. See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014) (featuring
concurring and dissenting opinions criticizing Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion
for rushing to find a statute ambiguous without making more of an effort to
discern statutory meaning); Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder, 758 F.3d 908, 913 (7th
Cir. 2014) (suggesting “a distinction between ‘clear’ meaning and a ‘better’ reading” in Chevron analysis); Bednar & Hickman, supra note 21, at 1419–27 (exploring the question and citing cases).
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tools of statutory interpretation ought to be considered in evaluating statutory clarity.25 And they have disagreed over whether
certain categories of cases should fall outside of Chevron’s reach,
and what those categories might be.26
The Supreme Court has led the way. In Christensen v. Harris County, the Court announced that only certain types of
agency pronouncements qualify for Chevron deference.27 In
United States v. Mead Corp.,28 the Court introduced “Chevron
Step Zero,” holding that Chevron deference is only appropriate
“when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority,”29 but equivocated about
exactly how to identify those conditions.30 In Barnhart v. Walton,
the Court further obscured Chevron’s scope by suggesting that
certain informal agency pronouncements might be due Chevron
deference depending on “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the
question to the administration of the statute, the complexity of
that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency
has given the question over a long period of time.”31 Just a few
terms ago, in King v. Burwell, the Court applied a separate “extraordinary cases” or “major questions” limitation on Chevron’s
scope, whereby deference is not due to agencies’ interpretations
of statutory provisions that carry special economic or political
significance.32
25. See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 47 (2014); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2153–54
(2016); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
26. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 848–52 (2001) (recognizing fourteen different disagreements
about Chevron’s scope that emerged in the doctrine’s first fifteen years).
27. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
28. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
29. Id. at 226–27; see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 26, at 873 (coining the
“Step Zero” term).
30. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31 (identifying “express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication” as “a very good
indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment,” but noting that “the want
of that procedure . . . does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found
reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was
required and none was afforded”).
31. 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
32. See 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).

2019]

CHEVRONIZATION OF AUER

109

Circuit courts have added their own wrinkles. In the D.C.
Circuit, for example, there is now a “Chevron Step One-and-aHalf,” requiring courts to withhold Chevron deference unless the
interpreting agency recognized that the statutory provision at
issue is susceptible of multiple interpretations.33 The Fourth Circuit has suggested that deference is not warranted when the interpretation at issue “is not based on [the agency’s] expertise in
the particular field.”34 Some circuits have embraced the notion
that an agency might be able to waive Chevron deference, even
though standards of review normally are for courts rather than
litigants to determine.35 And the list goes on. Justice Scalia complained in 2012 about “the ugly and improbable structure that
our law of administrative review has become,”36 and the complexity has only grown since then.
Indeed, Justice Scalia (among others) frequently bemoaned
the many exceptions and caveats that the Court had built into
Chevron precisely because they made Chevron hard to apply and
robbed it of much of its practical value—not just in terms of simplifying the judicial task, but also in terms of providing easy-tounderstand guidance for regulated parties.37 Even justices and
scholars who have advocated for the aforementioned exceptions

33. Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 757 (2017) (describing the “Chevron Step One-and-a-Half ” doctrine announced in Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); see Peter Pan
Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 1353–54
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
34. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Norton, 343 F.3d 239, 245 (4th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Burgin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 120 F.3d 494, 497 (4th Cir.
1997)).
35. See, e.g., Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 903 F.3d 1154, 1161 (11th Cir.
2018) (per curiam) (describing a circuit split over the issue). For more discussion
on Chevron waiver, see James Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be
Waived?, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 183 (2019); Jeremy Rozansky, Waiving Chevron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1927 (2008).
36. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 494
(2012) (Scalia, J., concurring).
37. See id.; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 245 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (assailing the majority’s application of Chevron as “confusing,”
full of “utter flabbiness,” and “virtually open-ended”); id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for replacing the simplicity of Chevron’s “across-the-board presumption” with “the indeterminacy of Skidmore deference”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to
Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2602 (2006) (“[Mead] has produced a
great deal of confusion and complexity, disappointing those who hoped that
Chevron would simplify the law.”).

110

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [103:103

and caveats recognized that they were doing so at the cost of simplicity and predictability.38
The result of Chevron’s evolution is a doctrine that many
now lament is so full of holes as to be troublesome in its application.39 Some scholars question whether there remains much
practical benefit in applying Chevron rather than a less deferential but more flexible and open-ended standard like Skidmore.40
This same question is increasingly pertinent for courts
charged with applying Auer. Exceptions and caveats—whether
characterized as recent innovations or simply features of the
original rule that were not expressly recognized until more recently—have profoundly transformed Auer deference. What was
formerly hailed as a simple, straightforward shortcut for quickly
and predictably resolving potentially thorny cases is more and
more a straitjacket that forces courts to resolve a different but
equally thorny (or sometimes thornier) set of questions.
Dueling Federal Circuit opinions in the Kisor case illustrate
the point. The dispute underlying Kisor is whether the claimant,
a veteran, is entitled to certain benefits for post-traumatic stress
disorder. The Department of Veterans Affairs denied the claimant’s request for those benefits. Its decision rested on the meaning of the word “relevant” in a regulation governing the reopening of veterans’ claims. A panel of the Federal Circuit held that,
as used in the regulation, “relevant” is ambiguous.41 Deferring
under Auer, the panel gave the term the meaning given it by
Board of Veterans Appeals, with the result that the claimant was
denied the benefits he sought.42
The Federal Circuit denied the claimant’s request for en
banc rehearing, but three judges dissented from that decision.43
They argued that “granting Auer deference to the [Department

38. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 235–37 (majority opinion) (“Justice
Scalia’s first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court’s
choice has been to tailor deference to variety.”).
39. See In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033, 1051 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Since Chevron, the Court’s standard has evolved in many ways, leaving in its wake a confusing path for courts to navigate.”); Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321
F.3d 835, 848 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Analyses by scholars and jurists alike have emphasized that [Mead and Barnhart] have further obscured the already murky
administrative law surrounding Chevron.”).
40. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075
(2016).
41. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
42. Id. at 1368.
43. Kisor v. Shulkin, 880 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc order).
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of Veterans Affairs’] interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations flies in the face of . . . the longstanding canon that provisions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are to be
construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.”44 According to the dissenters, there was no reason to apply Auer because applying the veteran-friendly Armed Services canon should have resolved any
doubts about the meaning of “relevant” in that case.45
At the circuit level, then, Kisor boiled down to a disagreement about the proper order in which to apply conflicting principles of interpretation (including deference doctrines). That happens to be an especially knotty area of the law, with courts and
scholars having already staked out a range of conflicting positions.46 And, as noted above, such “order of operations” questions
are just a few of the many that courts must now consider before
applying Auer.
The multifarious exceptions and qualifications courts have
attached to Auer, and the disagreements and uncertainties they
generate, invite the question: Does Auer still serve the practical
purposes its defenders have touted it as serving? There is a good
argument to be made that it does not. Whatever Auer’s practical
value was once understood to be, today’s legal landscape largely
gives the lie to any claims that Auer appreciably simplifies
things for courts, or that it improves consistency and predictability for regulated parties.
Consider the glut of recent cases in which members of the
same court are openly divided on the proper application of
Auer.47 The opinions in those cases evince “widespread confusion
44. Id. at 1380 (quotation marks omitted).
45. See id.
46. See Note, Chevron and the Substantive Canons: A Categorical Distinction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 594, 600–01 (2010) (summarizing some of the approaches advocated by prominent scholars); Patricia G. Chapman, Has the
Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas?, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 115, 164 n.303 (1998)
(same). Compare, e.g., United States v. Phifer, 909 F.3d 372, 384–85 (11th Cir.
2018) (concluding that the rule of lenity supersedes Auer deference in criminal
cases), and Maniilaq Ass’n v. Burwell, 170 F. Supp. 3d 243, 247–48 (D.D.C.
2016) (citing California Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d 1262,
1266 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and holding that the pro-Indian canon trumps Auer
deference), with Oppedisano v. Holder, 769 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding
that Chevron deference supersedes the rule of lenity), and Haynes v. United
States, 891 F.2d 235, 239 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that Chevron deference
trumps the pro-Indian canon).
47. See, e.g., Kisor, 880 F.3d 1378; United States v. Havis, 907 F.3d 439
(6th Cir. 2018); Marsh v. J. Alexander’s LLC, 905 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2018) (en
banc); Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 878 F.3d
725 (9th Cir. 2017); Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human
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[] on many aspects of Auer deference, including its scope, applicability, and the relevant factors to be weighed when applying
the doctrine.”48 Growing uncertainty about when and how to apply Auer is also consistent with data showing a downward trend
in the percentage of cases in which courts invoke Auer to affirm
an agency’s interpretation of a regulation.49 Perhaps the benefits
of applying Auer just aren’t worth the trouble.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Woudenberg v. Department of
Agriculture50 illustrates this latter point. In considering the
meaning of highly esoteric regulations promulgated by the Department of Agriculture, the court undertook an exhaustive
analysis that delved deep into the regulations’ text, structure,
purpose, and history (going so far as to review individual comments submitted prior to the agency’s amendment of the regulations in question).51 Only after affirming the agency’s interpretation on that basis did the court mention Auer deference, and
then only in the final two sentences of the opinion.52 The
Woudenberg court’s back-of-the-hand treatment of Auer—almost
as an aside—bespeaks a reluctance to lean on the doctrine, even
in cases where the doctrine seems to offer a straightforward answer, and even when the alternative is several pages of painstaking analysis.
To be sure, Auer’s increasing complexity is not the only reason courts might hesitate or disagree about how to apply it.53 But
if some courts are so reluctant or uncertain in applying Auer deference, that fact itself weighs against ascribing too much practical value to the standard because spotty application undermines
the principles of consistency and predictability Auer is supposed
to advance.54
None of what we have written here is to argue unequivocally
that Auer deference should be abandoned, whether in Kisor or
Servs., 867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017); G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch.
Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (vacated sub nom 137 S. Ct. 1239).
48. Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting Interpretations of
the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 66 ADMIN.
L. REV. 787, 787 (2014).
49. Barmore, supra note 9, at 815–16.
50. 794 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2015).
51. Id. at 597, 599–601.
52. Id. at 601.
53. Uncertainty about the doctrine’s future might be another factor
prompting courts to rest their decisions on non-Auer grounds.
54. See Recent Case, Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 129 HARV. L.
REV. 2281, 2286 (2016).
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some future case. Nor do we assert that there are no longer any
practical benefits to Auer.55 It seems inarguable to us, though,
that most of the pragmatic reasons for retaining Auer have been
substantially weakened by developments in the doctrine. If Auer
survives Kisor, it should not be because Auer deference makes
things significantly easier or more consistent and predictable for
courts or regulated parties. It doesn’t.

55. For example, some scholars contend one of the “pragmatic arguments”
for Auer is that it gives expert agencies (rather than inexpert judges) the primary role in applying often-technical regulations to complex changing circumstances. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 4, at 1460. That argument is
largely unaffected by the growing list of exceptions and qualifications to Auer,
except perhaps insofar as the exceptions and qualifications—by significantly reducing the number of cases in which courts ultimately defer to agencies’ expert
interpretations—diminish the agencies’ role.

